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Potential for Market Systems/Carbon Trading  
 
Executive Summary 
  
 
If carbon sequestration concerns are to be addressed through markets, the cap and 
trade mechanism is perhaps the most likely approach that will be taken in solving the 
carbon problem.  This is based in part on experience with the sulfur allowances market 
that is being implemented starting with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  It is 
recognized, however, that a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the matter of whether we 
might see emission allowance markets and the related carbon storage markets anytime 
soon.  As a result, the bulk of the report is devoted to highlighting the major parameters 
that will have to be considered, especially in designing markets for carbon offsets in 
stock (COIS) certificates.   
   
Emission limits would need to be set before emission allowance markets could be 
formed.  Carbon storage markets would likely appear next. It may well also be the case 
that farmers and ranchers would be faced with covering emissions of carbon and other 
greenhouse gases, while also being able to sell carbon offsets in stock for the carbon 
stored in land.  Also, the report highlights problems with green payments or markets in 
flows and in promises to apply best management practices. Neither of these two 
approaches seemingly make a close enough connection to the scarcity 1) in the 
atmospheric capacity to hold more carbon dioxide, or 2) in the agricultural soil and land 
capacity to store more carbon. Emissions allowances and carbon offsets in stock make 
these connections, and, as a result, are more likely to produce jointly equitable and 
efficient outcomes in both payment programs and markets.  
 
The report also takes the reader through an exercise in understanding how flows 
of carbon into a tract of land relate to the stocks of carbon in storage. A hypothetical set 
of numbers relating stocks and flows are presented in two figures, one showing the kind 
of time path one might expect for the level of carbon stored and the other showing the 
accretions, or the rates and flows of change in the carbon stock for each unit of time.  The 
flows are affected by how much carbon is already in the soil at any point in time.  It is 
demonstrated that as we approach the capacity of the soil to hold more carbon it becomes 
increasingly difficult to add more carbon to storage.  This leads to the contention that the 
additional costs of increasing the flows into the soil will only be incurred by farmers and 
ranchers if payments and prices also increase over time, and as we reach full storage 
capacity.   
 
The report then turns to addressing the nature of a property right in carbon stored, 
the carbon offsets in stock (COIS) certificate.  Various dimensions of COIS property 
rights are explored including the right to possess/exclusive control; right to use; right to 
manage; right to the income; right to the capital; right to the security; right to transfer; 
right of term/duration; right to prohibit harmful use; right to execution; and, right to 
residuary character.   It is clarified that a COIS is somewhat unusual in that even though 
it is sold, the seller is still in charge of managing the carbon in place such that the 
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relationship between the buyer and seller has to be maintained during the time of 
contract. Also, it is suggested that perhaps the seller be given the option of buying COIS 
certificates associated with other land and providing same to the buyer if for some reason 
it is necessary to reduce the carbon stored in stock on the land in question.  Rather than 
providing penalties for carbon stores being reduced, it is suggested to provide flexibility 
to the seller on how the contract can be satisfied.   
 
In terms of progress toward carbon storage markets, it is pointed out that after the 
Title IV Amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act resulted in actions to set national 
emission limits and to create a sulfur allowance market, it took about 3-years to introduce 
a market.  Some 7-years after introduction, the market is now functioning quite 
effectively.   Perhaps a 10-year horizon on setting emission limits leading to emission 
allowance and perhaps carbon storage markets is realistic for carbon as well.  It is also 
highlighted, however, that recent moves in the U.S. Congress to introduce somewhat 
opposing pieces of legislation in terms of eventual outcomes bears watching.  If the 
Conservation Security Act of 2001 passes, green payments may substitute for market 
prices in carbon stores, flows and/or for best management practices.  If the Clean Power 
Act of 2001 passes, emission limits will be set on carbon emissions, which could then 
lead to carbon emission allowance markets.  There seems to be a potential for disconnect 
here, using standard subsidy/payment programs in one case and the new cap and trade 
market mechanism in the other, placing the two approaches somewhat at odds.  
 
The report emphasizes the need to focus on carbon offsets in stock, i.e., focus on 
carbon stored in land rather than on flows into the land or on best management practices, 
no matter whether we face green payments or market prices.  Nebraskans may wish to 
develop a simulation exercise to help in experimenting with such a market on a case 
study, or special project basis.  A Nebraska Coalition, modeled after the Montana 
Coalition, might be formed to work with farmers and ranchers in putting together 
aggregates of carbon stored for possible sale.   It also is noted that perhaps the Nebraska 
Natural Resource Districts and the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources could play 
a role in certification and as a central point for data on transactions and features of the 
trade in offset certificates.  Nebraska based private sector firms also could be encouraged 
to consider providing certification and aggregation as well as brokerage and financial 
services in the new carbon markets.   
 
Fortunately, Nebraskans are a step ahead of most in other parts of the U.S. with 
respect to proactive involvement on carbon issues.   The State could continue taking the 
lead on this front, with the plan to further influence the conversation about the nature of 
the payment or market mechanisms that eventually evolve in carbon. Designing and 
testing a simulated and perhaps even a test market in carbon offsets in stock in a selected 
project area might be considered.
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Potential for Market Systems /  Carbon Trading1 
 
 
Gary D. Lynne and Colby E. Kruse2 
 
 
If we are to keep the market from overrunning everything else we hold 
dear, we need competent states.  And if we don’t want the state to be its 
own source of tyranny, we need strong democracy  (Kuttner, 1999). 
 
 
The task of this paper is to explore the various design features of a carbon offsets 
or carbon storage market that might evolve in Nebraska and the Great Plains region more 
generally.  Such a market could arise due to voluntary “baseline and credits” approaches 
leading to trading in offsets, or due to limits on emissions set by governments involving 
private sector trading in “cap and trade” approaches. Both approaches create a demand 
for places to sequester, that is, to store carbon in place, such as in the upper root zone 
area of  agricultural land.  In either case, as we approach the limits on the capacity of the  
atmosphere to hold more carbon dioxide,  we will likely experience rising prices in both 
the emissions and the  carbon storage markets, and/or  see growing government green 
payments focused on sequestering more carbon.  The fascinating political economic 
question rests on whether individuals will become sufficiently concerned with setting 
limits and building markets themselves, or if the concern will have to come through 
government setting limits on emissions.   Also, the question of the mix of government 
controls, subsidies and market mechanisms is yet to be resolved.  As the quote from 
                                                 
1 This background paper was prepared under contract with the University of Nebraska Public Policy 
Center, September, 2001. 
2 Lynne is professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and the School of Natural Resource Sciences, 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln.  Kruse is a graduate research assistant funded through the Agricultural 
Research Division.  Both authors are in the  Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the 
University. 
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Kuttner (1999) suggests, an appropriate mix reflects a kind of delicate, we may even say 
symbiotic, balancing as between market and government involvement, both operated on 
democratic principles. 
No matter where the limits arise and mix of mechanisms we ultimately choose, 
the current  political dialogue seems to suggest that the market will play a substantive 
role in the matter in any case, at least if the current administration is able to set the tone 
and direction of the conversation.  President  George W. Bush, while deeming the carbon 
emissions limits in the Kyoto protocol  unrealistic has simultaneously indicated  “I've 
asked my advisers to consider approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including 
those that tap the power of markets, help realize the promise of technology and ensure the 
widest possible global participation (NY Times, June 12, 2001).”  It is noteworthy that 
the sulfur emissions market was implemented during the previous Bush Administration, 
and Governor Jeb Bush of Florida, the President’s brother, has favored the use of markets 
help water allocation in Florida. Given the recent pronouncement by President Bush that 
we will “tap the power of markets” it may not be unrealistic to expect that we will see 
some kind of carbon market(s) within the next few years.   
We cannot necessarily predict the kind of markets or market mechanisms that 
might emerge here, or if certain elements of the U.S. Congress will instead manage to 
pass some version of the Conservation Security Act which will give green payments for 
sequestering carbon (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001).   We can only speculate with some 
reasonable level of confidence about the main considerations in designing carbon 
markets. In order to highlight the issues in forming such markets, we draw especially on 
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frameworks and ideas provided in Bromley (1989; 1991); Colby (2000);  Ellerman et al. 
(2000); Fiske (1992); Kuttner (1999);  Lynne (1999);  and Lynne and Saarinen (1993).  
  
Nature of the Carbon Right to Be Traded, and the Carbon Markets That May 
Emerge 
 
We can see the possibility that farmers and ranchers would someday be engaged 
in trading in Emission Allowances (EAs).  Each operation would establish a carbon 
emissions baseline, and be given EAs, perhaps measured in a 1-ton allowance for each 
ton of carbon currently emitted.  Then, EAs no longer used due to changing technology 
and practices to farm with lower emissions of carbon,  e.g., using less (hydrocarbon) fuel,  
could then be sold to another firm (perhaps another farm) that has to cover emissions and 
finds it less expensive to buy an allowance  than to make the technological switch.  
Emission Allowances could be related to Best Management Practices (BMPs), i.e., 
claiming a lower level of EAs needed for each BMP as compared to conventional 
practices.  Each BMP would  be associated with a certain EA requirement, and by 
definition a lower emission allowance than the allowance needed to cover conventional 
technology and practices.  So, adopting a BMP would free EAs established in the 
baseline for sale on the market. The problem with this approach is that it creates 
incentives to document a high baseline (i.e., initially show emissions of  large amounts of 
carbon and other green house gases) such that more allowances are given at the outset.   
In addition, farmers and ranchers may soon find opportunities for trading in 
Carbon Offsets (COs).   A farmer or rancher might be paid for a net, positive flow of 
carbon into the land, Cnet, where Cnet = (Cin-Cout), the amount in less the amount out, and 
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Cnet > 0.  One  may also be paid for the carbon stock,  Cstock, the amount retained in situ 
(in place), stored in the land, from year-to-year.  We might refer to the former, the Cnet,  
as a Carbon Offset In Flow, i.e., a net inflow of carbon into the land, or COIF,  and the 
latter, the Cstock, as a Carbon Offset  In Stock, i.e., carbon in place in the agricultural land,  
or COIS.   It is not clear at this time as to whether markets might arise in the net annual 
in-flows; in the stocks in place; or, in both.   
The problem is that  paying farmers and ranchers for net inflows into the stock  
without paying for stock in  storage will, behaviorally speaking,  create a perverse 
incentive to deplete soil carbon content so that one could again be paid for flows into the 
stock within the land.  If the market only pays for the net inflows in any given year and 
not for the established carbon in the soil,  profit-maximizing landowners and managers 
will likely mine (plow-up) the soil to make room for “new carbon (Zeuli, 2000, p. 239).”   
To avoid these perverse incentives, the carbon market will have to be constructed 
carefully.  For example, a two-tier pricing structure, one for already stored carbon and 
one for annually sequestered (new net inflow) carbon, could be utilized. Market forces 
could determine the equilibrium price differential between the two. Perhaps better yet, 
only a market for carbon stored in place and trade in a COIS certificate, perhaps each 
certificate measured in 1-ton units, would be developed.   
Paying only for stock in place and trading only COIS certificates would create an 
incentive to increase the rate of net inflow as well as to maintain the stock, so we see only 
a positive incentive from the stock side.  In fact, it may be desirable to focus all the 
attention on the stock in place and thus leave the concern about the flow into and out of 
the soil to the farm or ranch manager.  This also obviates the need to regulate 
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technologies and to mandate best management practices,  thus giving more freedom of 
choice and less government intervention.   With everyone focusing on carbon stored, we 
do not have to be concerned with what and how  technologies and practices are used to 
sequester carbon in the land,  or how it is released, except in the scientific and 
educational sense needed to help farmers and ranchers manage the carbon flows. 
The desirability of focusing on the stock in place, and thus on payments or prices 
for COIS,  is reinforced by recognizing that the rates of sequestration and release and the 
maximum potential capacity of a soil to hold carbon vary greatly.   Each soil in a 
particular situation and time sequesters and releases a variety of different kinds of carbon 
at different rates, which in turn is affected by how much carbon is in storage relative to 
the capacity at some point in time.  Also, each soil also has a different maximum storage 
capacity.   We might expect the relationship like that depicted in Figure 1 (hypothetical) 
depicting one situation, representing total carbon stock stored in an acre of land over 
time. 
The shape of this function follows that of Lal et al. (1999, p. 85), who draw a 
similarly shaped curve showing total carbon stored in all cropland in the U.S. as plotted 
against the number of years to reach the capacity of the land.  It is suggested that it could 
take another 50 years, until about the year 2050, to reach the top capacity for U.S. 
cropland to hold carbon.  
 
Stock and Flow Relationships  
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The soil on this hypothetical acre in Figure 1 is eventually full to capacity at about 
70 tons of stock in year 100.  Once the soil is fully stocked, we could expect a long flat, 
plateau area of the curve, suggesting the 70 ton stock would be maintained at capacity 
perhaps indefinitely.   We can now also illustrate how the rate at which carbon is 
sequestered, i.e., accretions or the flow (Figure 2) each year, will be related to how close 
we are to capacity in the stock (Figure 1) at any point in time.  Relating this back to the 
carbon offsets market idea, the COIF market would operate with the flow illustrated in 
Figure 2 while the COIS market would operate with the stock illustrated in Figure 1.  
To see the relationship between the stock and the flow,  assume we are now in  
year 42, with 48 years to go until the soil is full to capacity at year 100.  At year 42, we  
have about 35 tons in stock, i.e, stored in the land (See Figure 1). The pace of increase, 
the flow,  at this time will be fairly fast, as shown by the flow curve in Figure 1 being 
quite steep at year 42.  In fact, this is the fastest accretion or flow rate possible as   
illustrated in Figure 2. When the stock is 35 tons (which happens to be “now” in year  42, 
the accretion or flow rate is 1.75 tons per year, and we are at the top of the flow  curve 
(Figure 2).  As the soil fills, however, the growth rate slows (moving down and to the 
right of the peak in Figure 2, and toward the plateau of Figure 1), making it ever more 
difficult to increase the carbon in storage. The flow declines.   For example, when we 
have 60 tons sequestered, the flow is in the vicinity of 0.80 tons, and at 65 tons the flow  
is only about 0.5 tons (Figure2).   
Importantly, this decline in the flow or  accretion rate as we move to the right in 
Figure 2 and the movement to the plateau in Figure 1 also means that it will be ever more 
costly for farmers and ranchers to increase the amount of carbon stored in the soil as the 
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capacity is reached.  It will be substantively more costly to add 0.5 tons to the soil when 
the stock is approaching 65-70 tons than it was when the stock was less than 10 tons (a 
point at which the accretion rate was also 0.5 tons).  We would also expect, then, that the 
price of COIS certificates would have to increase over time in order to provide a 
sufficient financial incentive for farmers and ranchers to keep adding carbon.  As we 
move toward the peak of the flow curve in Figure 2 we would expect costs to declining;  
as we move further to the right beyond the peak, we would expect the cost to be 
increasing rather rapidly.  While we do not know the exact breakover, we might expect 
this kind of pattern as we move from conventional tillage through 30% residue cover in 
conservation tillage until we reach 100% residue cover in no-till. 
The numbers in Figures 1 and 2 are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes. 
What kind of actual accretions and capacities might we expect to experience in Nebraska 
conditions?  The scientific research is in short supply on this front.  It has been suggested, 
however, that for commonly used rotations and soils here in Nebraska where the carbon 
stock has been substantively reduced since the prairie was plowed, that accretion could 
run as high as 1-2 metric tons/ha-yr in rainfed systems (Lal et al., 1999), and 2-4 metric 
tons/ha-yr in irrigated systems (Duvick and Cassman, in press). This gives a range of  
0.45 tons per year on rainfed to 1.75 tons per year on irrigated.  Research in Nebraska has 
also shown that a typical corn field currently has about 90 metric tons per hectare  (about 
40 tons per acre) in storage in contrast to grassland on the same soil type holding about 
150 metric tons per hectare (about 67-70 tons per acre).  
Carbon, potentially, also leaves the soil.  The residence time of carbon in the soil 
varies greatly from a few minutes to hundreds of years and is dependent on the size of 
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soil particles with which the carbon is associated (Buyanovsky et al.,  1994, p. 1167).  In 
the pool of soil organic matter (and there are several different kinds), vegetative particles 
not yet decomposed have the shortest residence time. The rates of degradation appear to 
be inversely proportional to size, with residence time of 1-year for large plant fragments 
to 2-years for very small particles.  Organic matter in macro-aggregate form shows 
residence times of approximately 10-years.  Carbon associated with the silt and clay 
portions of the soil are reported to be in residence approximately 400- years and 100-
years, respectively (Buyanovsky et al., 1994, p. 1172).   
To better understand the release idea, and again using the two figures to illustrate,  
assume now we are currently at a stock level of 70 tons per acre.   If the farming practices 
on this tract shift to mining the carbon out of the soil, we will move back to the left on the 
growth curve in Figure 2, and down the curve to the left in Figure 1, i.e., stock in the soil 
will be declining.  As a result, the growth rate increases (the rate is higher to the left of 
the 70 tone point in Figure 2) and the farmer could again sequester carbon at a more rapid 
rate, and at lower cost.    If payments were being made for COIF (i.e., for accretions) 
rather than for COIS (i.e., for storage), moving to the left  by mining carbon out of the 
soil positions the farmer or rancher to again enjoy rapid rates of increase in the amount 
stored each year while being paid to re-sequester the carbon again. 
The rate of carbon release is also influenced by the vegetative cover.  A study 
performed by Jenkinson (1977, p. 429) illustrated that soil that had been under grass 
cover for 5-years contained 47% more of the originally added carbon than the same soil 
that was kept bare for 5-years.  The same experiment also showed some disturbing 
results.  In this experiment, one soil was kept under grass for 5- years, then plowed under 
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and left bare for the remaining 5-years.  A second soil was kept bare for the entire 10-
years.  At the end of the 10-year period, the soil that had grown grass for 5-years and then 
kept bare for 5-years contained just slightly more carbon than the soil that was kept bare 
for the entire 10-years (Jenkinson, 1977, p. 429).  Grazing was shown to decrease soil 
carbon levels in an experiment performed by Parton et al. (1987, p. 1173). This is to say, 
how we manage the land once it is in some crop moves us left or right in Figure 2, and 
affects the flow rates.  It also affects the amount in stored in stock as illustrated in 
movements left and right in Figure 1.  
 All this seems to suggest that if soil is to be used as an effective place to store 
carbon arising in carbon dioxide emissions, some land might have to be off-limits to any 
disturbances whatsoever, with other land mildly disturbed (e.g.,  grazed), while still other 
land would be farmed without concern for how much carbon is stored.  Alternatively, we 
would have to seek the optimal amount of carbon to store in each soil/crop combination 
looking at the marginal (additional ) benefits and marginal (additional) costs across the 
mixes with the goal of equating the marginal net returns from carbon stored in each.  
Which approach will be best has yet to be determined. 
Such biological and physical complexity adds to the complexity in the 
relationship between the Emission Allowance (EA) and the  Carbon Offset in Stock 
(COIS).  One might reduce the use of carbon on a farm such as through using less fuel in 
conservation tillage which creates extra EAs that the farmer could sell, and an increase in 
COIS available for sale. Alternatively, using less tractor fuel might result in using more 
herbicides which  also are produced with hydrocarbons, so perhaps the farmer even needs 
to purchase extra EAs (i.e., perhaps emitting even more carbon than with conventional 
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practices), even though COIS has increased.   That is, one can conceive of a situation 
where using large amounts of carbon inputs could increase soil carbon in storage while 
emitting more carbon than with other input packages.  Also, if markets in COIFs  evolve, 
and depending upon relative prices in the COIF and the COIS markets, the farmer may 
find it advantageous to buy back the COISs in order to mine out the carbon,  and then sell 
accretion (net inflow) on the COIF market.   In any case, we would expect at least two 
different markets emerging, one in EAs and one in COISs, and, conceivably, even a 
market in COIFs albeit this one creates problems unless there are also markets in COISs. 
If markets or green payments for best management practices also emerged, the 
complexity is compounded even further. 
Also, farms and ranches emit other kinds of greenhouse gases, so we perhaps 
cannot focus all the attention on carbon.  In addition to carbon dioxide (CO2), the 
greenhouse gases include the hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) and perfluorocarbons (PFC); 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6);  methane (CH4); and   nitrous oxide (N2O).  Agriculture is also 
part of the problem as well as the solution  for all of these gases, especially the methane 
and the nitrous oxide as well as carbon.   Domestic livestock (and manure) production 
generates large amounts of methane;  denitrification and nitrification process are 
enhanced by adding synthetic and organic fertilizers, resulting in releases of more nitrous 
oxide; and substantive quantities of hydrocarbon fuel are used to power agriculture, as 
well as to build the machinery and to manufacture the pesticides and herbicides, and thus 
agriculture also contributes substantive amounts of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.  
Agricultural crops also naturally produce carbon dioxide as well as use it in growth. 
Fortunately, crops use more than is  released, especially under certain kinds of 
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agricultural practices, e.g., minimum tillage, which is what leads to the potential for 
agriculture to be part of the  solution to the carbon problem.  
We need to remain cognizant of the other gases produced in agriculture, however, 
and the possibility that emission limits might also be placed on these gases.  If such limits 
were place on methane and nitrous oxide gases, e.g., farmers and ranchers might be faced 
with finding offsets for these emissions, perhaps having to buy emissions allowances for  
methane and nitrous oxide.  It is not outside the realm of possibility that farmers and 
ranchers could be faced with buying (and selling) emission allowances,  EAs, in methane, 
nitrous oxide and carbon allowances markets while simultaneously selling carbon offset 
in stock, COIS, certificates in a carbon storage market. It remains an open question as to 
whether farms and ranches would see a net profit from this buying and selling activity. 
There is also another subtle similarity between EAs and COISs that perhaps needs 
to be understood, and also adds strength to our contention that COISs need to be 
considered over COIFs or BMPs.  We already know that the EA approach works for the 
emission problem; by analogy, because they are similar in concept and definition, it 
seems reasonable to argue that a COIS will also work for the storage problem. There is 
good reason for this success. 
  In particular, when an EA represented in a 1-ton emissions allowance is placed 
on the market for sale this means that someone has found a way to reduce emissions by 
1-ton. Similarly, if a 1-ton COIS certificate is offered for sale, this means that someone 
has found a way to store a ton of carbon.  In both cases, we are making progress toward, 
at minimum, stabilizing the total amount of emissions at the overall limit (or, perhaps 
even reducing the total if someone who does not need to cover emissions still buys a 1-
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ton allowance), or, we are keeping still another ton out of the atmosphere by storing it in 
the land.  In contrast, with a sale of a COIF certificate or a  promise to install a Best 
Management Practice, we have accomplished neither:  All we are paying for is effort that 
may or may not stabilize (or reduce) emissions.  We could be anywhere left or right on 
the growth curve of Figure 2, and in some undefined location on the stock curve in Figure 
1.  Neither the COIF or the BMP are attached directly to the real limits we face, which is 
the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb more carbon dioxide and the capacity of the land 
to store more carbon. By focusing on EAs and COISs, respectively, we connect with the 
scarcities that will define these markets or payment programs. 
Just the potential complexity alone among market types reinforces the suggestion  
that the focus  is perhaps best placed on the stock of carbon in place, and on forming the 
COIS market.    And, as alluded to in  foregoing, we would propose that a carbon offset 
in stock, COIS, be represented by a 1-ton certificate, the certificate ensuring that this 1-
ton is indeed in place (certified) in the soil. A certification agency or a private firm 
providing this service for fee would be asked to do the checking and the re-certifying on a 
periodic basis.    
 
Legal Instrument Actually Used 
 
Is carbon in storage represented in a Carbon Offset in Stock certificate a mineral 
right?  Or, would the certificate be traded simply through a business contract for service?  
In law, carbon in the form of coal in place in land is a mineral and thus falls under 
mineral law. Organic matter in place in the soil is also carbon, so is it a mineral falling 
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under mineral law, or rather treated like other kinds of manufactured inputs  added to soil 
like commercial fertilizer?  If the latter, the matter of trading in COISs falls to business 
and contract law.  This general consideration needs to be resolved in legal research, and 
perhaps made a matter of law.    
Focusing on the COISs,   specific considerations in defining the nature of the 
legal instrument used in trading are now considered.   The main categories for 
consideration are drawn from Bromley (1989, pp. 187-190).  We offer a suggested way to 
design the new property right in a carbon storage commodity, although it is fully 
understood that the details all remain to be resolved:  
Right to possess/exclusive control.  Once the number of COIS 1-ton units  is 
certified on a farm or ranch, and the 1-ton certificates have been sold to a buyer, the 
buyer will have express control over it, although the seller still has certain duties 
associated with it.   Generally a seller will have to maintain the stock in place for the 
buyer, with the buyer having  recourse if the stock is somehow depleted during the 
contract period.  Perhaps periodic re-certification that the 1-ton is actually in place would 
be required.   Alternatively, the right may be defined from the outset as having various 
probabilities that the stock of carbon in place will vary, perhaps with weather conditions, 
and thus allowing for some flexibility in the amount of carbon that needs to be 
maintained in place by the seller over the duration of the contract.  Perhaps the certificate 
would carry a range, e.g., guaranteeing only that 1-ton plus or minus 0.10 ton will 
actually be in place at any given point in time.  Also, perhaps the total tons for a larger 
area could be guaranteed, with variation among particular tracts within a larger area 
recognized as normal.  
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Right to use.  The buyer would have the right and responsibility to claim the 
Carbon Offset in Stock is doing the work of holding carbon dioxide out of the 
atmosphere.    
Right to manage.  Intriguingly, the right to manage the Carbon Offset in Stock 
would probably not be sold to the buyer. The initial seller (farmer or rancher) would 
retain this right.  
Right to the income.  Generally, it might be expected that the buyer of the COIS 
certificate would have the right to any income that could be produced by perhaps leasing 
the COIS  to someone else during the contract period.  
Right to the capital.  The right to the capital associated with a COIS would be 
retained by the seller.  The land holding the carbon has the capital value.  A valuable 
COIS certificate would add capital value to the land. Seemingly, we could also  separate 
the  COIS for sale separately from the land, much like a mineral right.  The COIS may 
best be sold with the land, however, in that the owner would likely be ultimately 
responsible for how much carbon is stored.   
Right to the security.  The matter of security of the right is complex in that carbon 
may escape from a particular part of the landscape due to natural forces.  Perhaps the 
market will eventually distinguish the lower from the higher risk carbon stock in the 
market.  Prices for a stock of carbon in a rainforest, e.g., may be higher than for the stock 
of carbon in a corn field simply due the lower volatility in the forest.   Another aspect of 
security  is simply that the buyer has the right to that particular amount of carbon stored 
during the contract period. 
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Right to transfer.   Presumably a buyer could sell the Carbon Offset in Stock to 
another buyer, with only the need to inform the original seller.  In light of the carbon 
staying in a particular place no matter who the buyer, the new buyer has in effect become 
connected to the original seller once a buyer has sold (or leased) the COIS to another 
buyer. 
Right of term/duration.   Seemingly we will need annual durations, i.e., that  in 
any given year a buyer will have to hold a certain number of Carbon Offset In  Stock 
certificates with that years date on same.  A farmer or rancher would likely re-sell  COISs 
each year, much like selling any other commodity. Alternatively,  it may be possible to 
sell the COISs projected to be available each year at the outset of some contract period 
(Zeuli, 2000, p. 244), e.g., 10-years, especially for those who have perhaps almost 
reached the capacity of the soil at the top of the curve in Figure 1, and thus have 
substantive amounts of carbon stored.   In this case, too, each COIS certificate would 
have a time subscript attached to it, making it usable as an offset in that particular year 
only.  The discounted, annualized value of this one time payment at the beginning of the 
10 year period would have to be compared with the current annual payment that could be 
obtained this year, and a decision made as to whether to commit to a 10 year plan or 
simply re-sell the COIS certificates every year.  Some may prefer the lump sum payment 
at the beginning;  others may wish to take the perhaps greater risk of market fluctuations 
year to year and enjoy the higher average payoff over time.  Under a 10 year plan, 
perhaps penalties for intentional carbon release would have to be built into this system 
(McCarl, 1998 in Zeuli, 2000, p.. 244), although this is a moral issue with many not 
seeking only the self-interest.  That is, penalties may not be necessary, especially if the  
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the farmer or rancher is allowed to cover any losses in storage by purchasing COIS 
certificates from someone else.  Purchased COIS certificates would be made available to 
the buyer holding the COIS on the land in question. This would give the seller of a 10 
year supply flexibility, which leads to efficiency. It could also be a moral efficiency, in 
that the sellers and buyers can avoid immoral behavior (i.e., mining out carbon stocks 
that have been sold) by covering any mining with purchases in an efficient COIS market.  
This is an important consideration in designing a market and points to the intricate 
connection between the moral dimension and the economic efficiency dimension of 
markets.  
Also, we may need to expect that the duration of the contract will be heavily 
influenced by the natural and physical aspects of carbon.  As suggested in Figure 2, ssoils 
can sequester carbon for years, but once they are plowed, that sequestered carbon can 
easily be lost. The whole purpose of a sequestration project is then compromised as much 
of the carbon is turned to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide.  
Right to prohibit harmful use.  It is difficult to see how a Carbon Offset in Stock 
could lead to any kind of harmful use.  Yet, as with all ownership in the U.S., this is a 
standard feature of owned property, i.e., one does not generally have the right to harm 
others with ones  property. 
Right to execution.  A buyer would perhaps best be given the right to sell the 
Carbon Offset in Stock certificate to another buyer at any time during the contract period, 
e.g., selling the COIS certificates associated with year #5 to another buyer.  The original 
seller (land owner) would have the right to sell the COIS  to another buyer at the end of 
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the contract period, no matter what buyers held the COIS certificates at the end of the 
period. 
Right to residuary character.  If a buyer for some reason abrogated the rights, 
presumably any remaining storage value would revert to the state, until such time as the 
contract ended, and the seller could re-sell the Carbon Offset in Stock to another buyer. 
 
Measuring, Monitoring and Enforcement 
 
A critical aspect of establishing a carbon emissions trading market in COIS is the 
measuring, monitoring and enforcement of soil carbon levels.  The measurement and 
monitoring difficulty  is compounded with the current situation of there being no 
universal method used when testing for soil organic matter.  Also, soil testing is relatively 
expensive.  A basic soil test that measures organic matter and soil nutrients usually takes 
samples over a 5-20 acre area and costs around $25/sample (NRDC, 2000, p. 6).  These 
costs may be high when compared to the potential value of soil carbon. There are several 
possibilities, however, for lowering the costs of measuring soil carbon.  Enforcement is 
also impossible without good measurement and monitoring tools and capabilities. 
One possibility for approaching measurement is by combining sampling of other 
soil characteristics (e.g., fertility) with carbon sampling.  Many farmers already take 
annual soil samples for the purpose of testing for fertility.   Perhaps the organic matter 
testing could also be done at this time.   For this to work, timing requirements of soil 
carbon measurements must be met (NRDC, 2000), and will be conditioned by the risk 
levels acceptable to those participants in the market.  Another possibility is for the U.S. 
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Natural Resource Conservation Service  to expand the Natural Resources Inventory to 
include carbon flux, although this is a sampling procedure with the focus on larger areas 
of certain kinds of soils.  This inventory is conducted every 5-years, and the next 
inventory coincides with the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (NRDC, 2000), 
although now even the Protocol itself is in question.  Including soil carbon in these 
inventories, however, could involve considerable additional planning and implementation 
costs.  Also, connecting these data to actual aggregations of tracts of land could be 
problematic unless the same boundaries were used for the testing and the aggregate sold 
on the markets. 
Assuming low opportunity costs on time during off-seasons, measuring and 
monitoring costs could be greatly reduced if farmers collected their own samples instead 
of hiring professionals.  Once a sampling site is identified, soil sampling can be done 
with only modest equipment and skills  (NRDC, 2000).   Also, permanent plots could be 
staked out which could be found later and retested in each period.  Although lab costs 
vary on a state-by-state basis, analysis of farmer collected samples including a test for 
organic matter content costs between $2.50 and $9.00 per sample for a farmer collected 
sample, although this price reflects a public subsidy (NRDC, 2000).  Such a subsidy 
might be justified, however, as part of the (social) transactions costs associated with the 
carbon market(s); perhaps some public  investment in soil sampling could be justified in 
light of the public benefits that would likely be gained from having more carbon 
sequestered.    
Remote sensing could also possibly be used to measure soil carbon changes.  
Experts contend, however, that remote sensing would need to take place more frequently 
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than satellite information is presently generated (NRDC , 2000).  In addition, if the focus 
is on best management practices rather than soil carbon, we see another problem:  As 
noted by the NRDC (2000), parameters based on estimates of the frequency of different 
farming practices may be difficult to prove or disprove at a single farm level.  
Also, we need to keep in mind that some degree of measurement error in soil 
carbon stocks may not be a barrier to establishing an efficient carbon storage market, 
although insurance and contract mechanisms could be developed to account for error.  
Zeuli (2000, p. 239) makes a similar observation regarding payments and markets for 
best management practices:    “For example, farmers within a fairly homogeneous region 
could receive an average carbon sequestration rate per acre with the adoption of no-till.  
As long as market regulators accepted this average, with the knowledge that it 
represented a range of expected carbon sequestration rates, no further precise 
measurement would be needed.  Markets can accept some uncertainty and still function 
efficiently.”  We would expect that a COIS certificates market would also be able to 
handle some imprecision in the  measurement of soil carbon as well.  
One possibility to supplement actual field level measurement is suggested by the 
use of simulation models, such as the Century Ecosystem Soil Organic Matter Computer 
Model (see Parton et al., 1987;  Metherall et al., 1993; and Paustian et al., in preparation, 
all cited in Natural Resource Conservation Service,  2001).  This model uses information 
and data on current cropping and tillage systems in place on the land and the resource 
data on characteristics of the climate and soils to simulate rates of carbon sequestration 
(NRCS, 2001, p. 4).   Another tillage system can then be introduced or expanded, e.g., 
more no-till farming, and new estimates of higher rates of carbon sequestered developed.  
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To the extent such a model is accurate within tolerable limits, it perhaps could serve to 
make claims to potential buyers of carbon storage that the carbon is actually in the 
ground.   These kinds of models could perhaps be used to supplement actual ground 
measurements, determining how much carbon is actually in place.  Measurements over 
time could also be used to calibrate the model.  The advantage of such simulators is in 
their cost of use, with the possibility of developing literally hundreds or thousands of 
simulations under a variety of conditions for quite modest cost.  
Assuming we can solve the storage content measuring problem, including perhaps 
ways to simulate such content,  we still need to address the monitoring and enforcement 
problem, although the latter disappears under good design.  It is likely though that 
participation in monitoring would have to be mandatory (NRDC, 2000), much as it is a 
precondition for participating in the sulfur market (Ellerman et al., 2000, p. 9).  As noted 
earlier, enforcement becomes largely a non-issue other than the need to have the soil 
carbon content re-certified on a periodic basis, if the seller is given the flexibility of 
substituting COIS certificates purchased elsewhere for carbon stored in the land at that 
place. 
 
Initial Determination of Tradable Emission Allowances and Carbon Offsets 
 
As suggested from the experience with establishing the baseline allocations of 
emission allowances in the case of sulfur (see Ellerman, 2000 as summarized in Lynne 
and Kruse, 2001),  establishing baseline allowances for methane, nitrous oxide and 
carbon on farms and ranches could be even more difficult, due if for no other reason than 
to the large numbers of operations.  It remains to be seen whether emissions allowance 
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markets could even be established at that level of specificity. Even though difficult, 
however, it is not outside the realm of possibility that an agency like the U.S. Natural 
Resource Conservation Service could play a substantive role in determining the baseline 
on each farm.  The NRCS already has helped large numbers of farmers and ranchers 
develop conservation plans.  It seems establishing a baseline of emissions for each kind 
of greenhouse gas emitted on each farm and ranch could be done within the context of a 
conservation plan.  
In terms of carbon offsets in flow and in stock, it seems that measuring the flow 
could be far more costly, however, than measuring the stock.  Other than for research 
purposes, such measurement is perhaps out of the question at an operational level, on a 
day-to-day, year-to-year basis even with the best of precision agriculture approaches.  
Measuring the carbon in place in the stock of the soil, however, seems workable as 
suggested in the previous section.   Again, it seems the focus needs to be placed on the 
carbon offsets in stock idea, and seek ways to certify both the stock of carbon in place at 
the outset and on a continuing basis.  Again, perhaps the conservation planning that is 
being done jointly between farmers/ranchers and the NRCS could also lead to a way to 
include the carbon stock in the soil as part of the datum showing the status of the plan as 
well as  serve to clarify the goal of the plan, i.e., to reach some point toward the plateau 
of the carbon storage curve in Figure 1.  Sound economic analysis would also need to 
become a part of the conservation planning process, however, in that it will not likely be 
appropriate from a strictly economic efficiency perspective to operate with the soil filled 
to capacity, although a jointly moral and efficient purpose could lead to such a point. 
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Continuing Certification of Carbon in Stock (and Perhaps the Net In Flow of 
Carbon)  
 
Once a market is operant, both new and  previous buyers in the market for Carbon 
Offsets in Stock will need to be assured how much carbon is still stored, or, if the 
government payment or market price  is for net inflow of carbon, how much is indeed 
moving into the land in any given interval of time agreed to in the contract. A 
certification entity could be a government agency, e.g., the U. S. Natural Resource 
Conservation Service, or, perhaps a state entity like the Nebraska Natural Resource 
Districts, or the Department of Natural Resources.  Perhaps all three could play a role, 
such as planning and baseline determination  in the NRCS; certification in the NRDs; and 
maintaining a central data base on carbon trades in the DNR.    It is also possible that 
private firms could  provide the baseline and  certification service for a fee. It is probably 
best that data bases be maintained in the public realm, however.   For example, the SGS, 
an international firm, recently certified the amount of carbon in stock within several 
Costa Rican rainforests (See Lynne and Kruse, 2001).  The amount of carbon traded on 
international markets, however, would probably be best registered in an agency of the 
United Nations as well as by local agencies like the Nebraska DNR, and national 
agencies like the U.S. EPA. 
Frequency of certification also needs to be determined, although one period may 
not have to be universally applied to all situations.  For example, it may not be necessary 
to re-certify the amount of carbon in a grassland  as frequent as would be needed for an 
annual crop like corn.  Perhaps a re-certification could be done every 3-years for annual 
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crops and every 5-years for grassland.    Also, perhaps remote sensing could somehow be 
applied every year with soil sampling done on even longer intervals to check and 
calibrate carbon storage prediction models, with the offshoot that  prediction models 
associated with remote sensing could be improved over time. 
The spatial dimension must also be resolved.  Perhaps measuring, monitoring and 
certification could all be done on  a watershed basis, e.g., with tracts of land at that scale 
brought to market with carbon storage certified to be at least a certain level across the 
entire watershed.   Working at a watershed level could also give more bargaining power 
with large companies who are buying carbon offsets in storage.  The problem with 
working at the watershed scale in area wide sampling is the disconnect with specific 
farms and ranches; knowing where the sequestration and storage maintenance is actually 
taking place; and ensuring ensure those who are actually applying the effort are rewarded 
for their actions. Some mechanism would have to be developed to ensure any payments 
or market revenues received from the aggregate sale are distributed in a just and fair 
manner back to those farmers and ranchers making a difference in the watershed.  We see 
the potential role for an aggregator:  Perhaps the aggregator would do the area-wide 
testing only in the areas associated with the farms and ranches the aggregator has 
managed to bring together into a more or less contiguous block of land.  
 
 
Or, Initial and Continuing Re-Certification of Best Management Practices and 
Technologies on the Farm/Ranch? 
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Some seem to believe that carbon sequestration can be accomplished by 
establishing payments or market sales of guarantees by a farmer to apply certain Best 
Management Practices (BMPs).  This seems to be the flavor of the recently introduced 
Conservation Security Act (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001).   This is also the approach of the 
Canadian consortium of power companies in working through the Iowa IGF crop 
insurance company (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001).  Options are being negotiated on the 
possibility of farmers promising at some point in the future to apply certain packages of 
best management practices. Payments and market transactions are focused on the 
certified BMPs on the farm.             
Much as with the payments or markets in carbon flows into land, potentially 
serious problems exist for this strategy, in that one cannot easily verify that practices are 
being applied, now how well the practices are being applied.  Inappropriate application of 
a practice could result in little to no carbon being sequestered. Also, it is not always clear 
just what a particular BMP, or how it is applied, does to the rate and level of carbon 
sequestered in the soil. Also, the effectiveness of a BMP will vary greatly dependent 
upon where the farm is situated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Some also believe that it may be feasible to provide predictions of the effects of 
various best management practices by a field level carbon sequestration model that is 
sensitive to local soil types, crop rotations, climate, tillage, cover crops, and organic 
amendments.  The USDA Agricultural Research Service is currently developing this type 
of model, named CQESTR, that will compute decomposition rate and residence time in 
the soil of carbon from organic matter, roots, crop residue, and organic carbon. (See: 
http://warp.nal.usda.gov/ttic/tektran/data/000011/22/0000112230.html ).  This model will 
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use data sets that are available nationally.  Such models could perhaps be used as one tool 
for associating applied BMPs on a particular farm or in a region with the expected levels 
of carbon that may be sequestered, but perhaps can never substitute for actual field 
measurement of carbon changes or, perhaps better yet, measurements of  carbon actually 
stored in place. 
 
Need for Aggregators   
 
 
No matter the nature of the commodity traded (i.e., Carbon Offsets for net inflows 
or storage in place, or promises to apply best management practices), it will likely be the 
case that at least some buyers will prefer to purchase larger aggregates, e.g., perhaps 70 
million tons of carbon stored on 1 million acres rather than 70 thousand tons on 1000 
acres, and more than likely wanting to deal in aggregates of more than  70 tons on one 
acre.3   For large operations, perhaps the individual manager could enter the market with 
the carbon stored in place on that unit.  For small and even mid-side operators, however, 
it may be necessary for some kind of aggregator organization to bring together small 
amounts of sequestered carbon into larger packages for sale.  It seems reasonable to 
expect that most buyers may wish to deal with one aggregator rather than  hundreds or 
perhaps thousands of  smaller offerings.    
The recent involvement of an Iowa insurance company in approaching approach 
individual farmers is again a case in point.  The insurance company played this 
                                                 
3 Then again maybe not:  The current sulfur allowance emissions market sells as little as 1-ton at a time to 
individual buyers.   Eventually there could be literally millions of sellers, offering small numbers of 1-ton 
allowances for sale on both  the sulfur and the carbon allowances market.  This could also evolve for the 
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aggregating role in negotiating the deal with the consortium of Canadian power plants 
(see Lynne and Kruse, 2001).  Also, the Montana Coalition serves this role by 
approaching individual land owners and in helping them with tree plantings, with the 
carbon stored by aggregates of land owners  then made available on the market through a 
private corporation (Montana Watershed, Inc.) associated with the Coalition.  
Intriguingly, this aggregating function could be done by the private sector (e.g., the Iowa 
insurance company) or the public sector (e.g., the Montana Coalition that operates at least 
in part on public funds, but is connected privately through the Montana Watershed, Inc. 
unit).   
As noted, in Nebraska one possibility would be to ask the Nebraska Natural 
Resource Districts to take on this role.   The Districts are organized more or less on 
watershed boundaries, which now would also become carbon boundaries in the sense of 
aggregates of carbon stored within a particular watershed.   Buyers could potentially 
approach purchasing any magnitude of carbon stored that they desired from a few tons to 
the potentially hundreds of million tons stored in some of the larger watersheds.   The 
Districts in turn would work  with individual landowners, and serve to certify that the 
carbon is actually stored on the land in question.   
Private aggregator companies may also emerge in Nebraska.   If a public entity 
like the  Natural Resource Districts was not pressed into such service, more than likely 
such private companies will indeed emerge.   Also, the Nebraska Unicameral may wish to 
consider the model represented in the Montana Coalition that was originally formed with 
a legislative appropriation to hire an executive director and staff to serve in helping the 
                                                                                                                                                 
carbon storage market.  Web and internet technology is such that it would not be impossible for each land 
owner to offer Stored Offsets In Stock perhaps even from small acreages on the peripheries of urban areas.    
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aggregating function.   A Nebraska Coalition could in turn work with the NRDs in a 
productive way, perhaps the NRDs serving mainly in the role of  certifying that the 
carbon is actually stored in place while the Nebraska Coalition could serve the 
aggregating function. 
 
Trading Entities  
 
Related to the matter of aggregators, the question of who would be allowed to 
trade in  carbon offset  markets needs to be resolved.  In the case of the sulfur markets, 
electric power utilities are both the main sellers and buyers of sulfur allowances.  Yet, the 
market is not closed, with even individuals allowed to participate in buying and selling 
allowances.  An individual can purchase a 1-ton sulfur allowance and give it as a birthday 
present to an environmentalist friend, for example!  
We might also realistically expect that brokerage firms, real estate agencies and 
other kinds of environmental financial products firms may enter the fray.    As 
highlighted in Lynne and Kruse (2001), the Environmental Financial Products, L.L.C., 
company of Chicago recently helped negotiate a trade between the Montana Coalition 
who represented two native American Indian tribes and an United Kingdom firm. We 
might also expect carbon bankers, like the International Carbon Bank and Exchange (see 
Lynne and Kruse, 2001),  to provide clearing house services. 
 
Trading Overview and Approval Process 
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Much like with sulfur emissions trading, we would anticipate that any carbon 
emissions and carbon offsets trading will be ongoing across state and national borders as 
if the borders did not really exist, nor will it matter the source of the carbon.  It will also 
not matter where the carbon is sequestered, just so long as it is sequestered, and stays in 
place.  This reality raises fundamental questions, though, about who will keep records on 
who is sequestering how much carbon when,  where and how much is stored.  At the 
national  level, perhaps we would ask the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, or the 
U.S. Department of Energy, or perhaps the U. S. Natural Resource Conservation Service 
to provide this service. As noted in Lynne and Kruse (2001),  EPA now provides a central 
point for keeping all the records on how many sulfur allowances are available and being 
held where and by whom. Perhaps the climate change division of the United Nations 
could provide this service on a world-wide scale.  The important point is that something 
equivalent to the EPA national data base, or, if we need to become even more formal in 
the law, perhaps something equivalent to the register of deeds now used in the U.S. to 
register  land trades needs to be established for carbon Carbon Offsets in Stock 
certificates.   In fact, we may even wish to use the current structure of county registers of 
deeds in Nebraska for this purpose. 
We would also anticipate that much like for regular land transactions there would 
not be any need for government overview or  pronouncements on the nature of the 
conditions of the trade.   Individuals could buy and sell COIS certificates  without 
approval of some outside entity.  The only requirement of the buyers and sellers would be 
that such trades be registered and made a matter of record in some central location.  It 
would also be desirable that  the agreed to price be recorded at that same location.  One 
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would then also anticipate that prices could be made public information, which would 
then improve the quality of trades on later rounds of trading.  
 
Fees to Cover Administrative Costs 
 
It is not likely that Nebraska’s Natural Resource District could play any 
substantive role in carbon storage trading or in certifying stocks in place without 
additional funding.  It seems, though, that each transaction could be charged a small fee, 
not unlike a real estate agents fee, at the time of the transaction with such funds made 
available to the NRDs. Alternatively, if the private sector takes on this function, perhaps 
something on the order of 5% of the value of the transaction would become a realistic 
fee, with the percentage perhaps lower for larger transactions.  Also, depending on how 
this evolves, we could see fees for certification being separate from fees for aggregation 
and brokerage, with separate entities involved in each. 
  
Linking Use Levels to Resource Conditions 
 
Some central entity will have to keep score to see that overall limits on emissions 
are being met; that the same number of emissions allowances are always in place 
covering the emissions of each firm; and, that the carbon is indeed remaining sequestered 
as represented in the number of  Carbon Offset In Stock certificates currently issued.   As 
noted earlier, perhaps the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources could play some 
role here, as well as the U.S. EPA at the national level, and seemingly some division of 
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the United Nations at the global scale. Aggregators could play a key role  in providing 
high quality data to central points. 
 
Likely Success of a Nebraska Carbon Offsets Market or Payments Program 
 
In order for a carbon offsets market or a green payments program for storing 
carbon  to be effective, the value of  stored carbon must be high enough that farmers and 
other landowners would adopt technologies and practices that would sequester more 
carbon. Currently, many landowners are mining carbon from the ground by tilling the 
land and otherwise farming they way they currently do, suggesting they are making a 
profit from this practice, or else they wouldn’t continue the mining.  Therefore, the value 
of sequestering carbon on their land must be at least equal to the current value they are 
receiving from their conventional practices, and probably has to be substantively greater 
in order to induce changes in technologies and sequestration  practices.  
We have found that most farmers are dually motivated, pursuing both more 
profits and the good things that come from being responsible in their use of 
environmental technologies and practices  (see Lynne et al., 1995; Lynne and Casey, 
1998).  Most farmers jointly seek satisfactory outcomes in both the material and moral 
realms. This is to say, appealing to farmers and ranchers to do-the- right-thing and 
sequester more carbon could well increase the amount of carbon sequestered, but only if 
sufficient profits are also generated by the new practices such that it becomes financially 
feasible.  We expect this will be the case in the matter of carbon sequestration as well, 
 33
even though  we need an increased commitment on behavioral research  designed to deny 
this contention. 
What kinds of values will likely be generated in the markets, or in government 
green payment programs?   The Office of the Chief Economist (1999) suggests that a 
carbon emissions allowance might trade for $14-23 per metric ton by 2010. Without 
trading, a U.S. Department of Energy study (Edmonds et al., 1997) suggests a cost to the 
economy of $108 per metric ton. This suggests a range of $14 to $108 per metric ton, or 
around $13 to $98 for a 1-ton emissions allowance.  We would expect the value of a 
carbon offsets in storage certificate representing 1-ton in storage to at least be highly 
correlated with the emissions allowance price in that a buyer would have the option of 
buying an allowance or vying, instead, for storage.  It may be important to keep in mind, 
however, that these estimates are from simulation models.  As we learned in the sulfur 
allowances markets, the simulators tended to greatly overestimate the actual prices that 
have emerged in the actual markets (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001). 
Intriguingly, Nebraska could probably play a substantive role in the overall 
national picture due to Nebraska being a major agricultural player, generally ranking 
fourth  in  the Nation in farm sales value. Current estimates on the potential for carbon 
sequestration show that U.S. cropland has an overall potential to sequester 75-208 million 
metric tons of carbon equivalent per year (MMTCE/yr).  If these numbers were realized, 
this would be 8 percent of total U.S. emissions of green house gases or 24 percent of the 
proposed U.S. emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (Lal et al., 1999).  Paustian 
et al. (1977)  estimated that for a field planted in a corn-soybean rotation in Iowa, 
converting from conventional till to no-till could increase carbon storage rates by about 
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550 kg/ha/yr (about 0.25 tons/acre).  Potential increases in Nebraska soils are likely to be 
similar. 
In the entire U.S., conservation tillage which is the main way to increase the 
amount of carbon in storage was practiced on 109 million acres of U.S. farmland in the 
year 2000.  This is around  36% of total planted area, an increase from 26% in 1990 
(Frederick, 2001).  No-till farming was practiced on over 52 million acres, an increase of 
over 300% from 1990 numbers (Frederick, 2001).  Numbers for Nebraska show relatively 
even more conservation tillage, perhaps over 50% of the cropland represented in over  8 
million acres.   As a result, considering that conservation tillage is classified as tillage 
practice that leaves above 30% residue on the surface, the potential for increased carbon 
storage in the soil is definitely present because residue cover could be increased to 100% 
(Frederick, 2001).   
Also, to place the 8+ million acres number in perspective, Nebraskans farm and 
ranch 46.4 million acres or 96% of the state’s land area.  About 23 million acres are 
rangeland and pasture land, with about half in the Sandhills area.  This leaves slightly 
over half of the 46.4 million in crops and other uses.   A total of  19.4 million acres were 
harvested in 1999.   About 8.1 million acres, mainly corn and soybeans but also including 
such things as sugar beets and some hay crops, are irrigated.   So, we have around 1/3  of 
the cropland under conservation tillage, which is about the same amount of  land that is 
currently irrigated,  and about 1/2 of all the agricultural land is already in rangeland and 
pasture land.   This is to say, we are already sequestering and storing in place substantive 
amounts of carbon on 2/3 of the agricultural land (the conservation tillage cropland plus 
the range and pasture land).  
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In thinking about converting the remaining 1/3 of the land to conservation tillage; 
moving to no till and upwards of 100% residue on a larger proportion of the conservation 
tillage land;  or, moving more acres of cropland to grass such as through the conservation 
reserve program,  we need to consider the financial and behavioral realities at work.  
There may be reasons other than that of sequestering carbon  for farmers to convert or not 
convert from conventional tillage systems to conservation tillage and no-till, or to move 
cropland into grassland.   
First, by using conservation tillage systems, operating costs of farming may well 
decrease, usually due to saving fuel.  Second, in some cases, especially on steeper sloping 
land, conservation tillage systems will also result in higher yields (Casady and Massey, 
2000).  For example, in Southeastern Nebraska, dryland corn farmed with conventional 
tillage has an average yield of 85 bushels/acre, while dryland corn farmed under no-till 
has an average yield of 90 bushels/acre (Selley, 2001).  When this area is farmed under a 
center pivot irrigation system, a conventional tillage system averages 155 bushels/acre, 
while no-till yields an average of 160 bushels/acre (Selley, 2001).  In this region, a case 
can be made for a switch to no-till farming based on yield differences.  
Third, the risk level may change substantively.  Variability in yield may change 
under conservation tillage, and thus change the variance in profit as well (Day et al. 1998, 
McCarl and Schneider, in Zeuli, pg. 243, 2000).  Studies have shown that farmers view 
risk as a major factor in not using best management practices,  even though they may 
have been demonstrated, on average, to generate  savings in operating costs or more 
yield.  One study found that farmers perceive the risk of changing their practices to 
exceed $40 per acre (Feather and Cooper, 1995, in Zeuli, pg. 243, 2000).  When profits 
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are less certain, a farmer’s willingness to participate in a carbon market  decreases. So, 
both sellers and buyers of  carbon offsets will face risk in the levels of carbon that can 
actually be sequestered.  There is no guarantee that a certain carbon inflow will be 
obtained, or that a particular storage level can be maintained.  Many variables can affect 
carbon sequestration, such as extreme rainfall levels or colder than expected temperatures 
(Zeuli, pg. 244, 2000).  In the face of such risks, the challenge to the efficiency of a 
carbon market is its ability to find a price that attracts enough participants into the market 
and at the same time keep the total costs of the market below those that a command and 
control (or subsidy) policy would entail (Zeuli, pg. 244, 2000). 
Fourth, moving from crop to pasture land could represent substantive losses in 
revenue and profit.  Prices high enough or government payments large enough to shift 
land use out of such profitable crops as irrigated corn and soybeans to pasture and 
rangeland in order to sequester more carbon are not likely.  We have to keep in mind that 
we add value to a substantive amount of the corn produced on millions of acres in 
Nebraska with the livestock feeding industry.  Eliminating substantive acreages currently 
under crops, especially corn, would eliminate or greatly impact a very large livestock 
feeding industry as well.   Also, some people are ranchers and some are farmers;  
individuals do not easily cross these lines.  It is not likely that some crop farmers would 
ever switch only to pasture (and the livestock operation that would have to result), no 
matter the price of carbon offsets.    
This does not mean, however, that carbon offset prices could not be high enough 
to change some practices and technologies used in cropping operations.  Also, some 
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marginal cropping areas might also be switched to carbon storing crops such as pasture 
and range even with modest carbon offset prices for carbon stored.  
Finally, we also face many potential implementation obstacles beyond the farm 
level.  Potential food shortages in the future may require more acres to be cropped.  Insect 
damage to crops may require more pesticides/ insecticides which could increase the 
amount of hydrocarbons used.  Weed infestation in crops could increase if the amount of 
acres farmed in no-till increases, and thus pulling more land back into production.  On the 
positive side, it is also possible that higher concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere 
could reduce the need for bringing more land into production.  Some evidence exists that 
crop yields may actually increase from higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
In this case,  sequestering carbon and holding it in storage could work counter to the 
positive effects of more rapid plant growth and higher yields, suggesting an intriguing 
play as between the corn market and the carbon storage market, with farmers reacting to 
relative prices.  
  
Could Nebraska Compete in a Global Carbon Market?  
 
Perhaps the most  critical aspect regarding Nebraska’s ability to compete in a 
global carbon market is whether payments will be rendered for the amount of carbon 
stored in stock in the soil or only for the amount of increase in the net inflow into the soil. 
With over 2/3 of  Nebraskas’ acreage currently holding substantive quantities of carbon, 
payments or prices only for new adoption of BMPs or for accretions to the carbon stock 
will  benefit only a very few of the farmers and ranchers in this group. Also, as noted 
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earlier, if farmers and ranchers are not rewarded for already having stored substantive 
amounts of carbon,  a perverse incentive would be created where it could well benefit 
them to plow out the land, thus releasing the stored carbon, and then receiving payments 
or being able to sell carbon offsets in flow, and starting again to build carbon in storage.    
It follows that if a carbon offsets market; a  best management practice market;  or 
payment system,  is to establish and maintain its moral integrity, payments perhaps are 
best based on the total amount of carbon stored in stock.   This seemingly holds the most 
potential to be a just and fair way to handle such a payment or market in that those who 
have been storing carbon for years are then rewarded for doing so, and will have an 
incentive to keep doing so.  Those who have been instead mining carbon will now also 
have an incentive to build the store of carbon in the soil. By focusing on the carbon stored 
in the land we are perhaps best positioned to reach a jointly moral and economically 
efficient solution to the problem. 
Also as alluded to earlier, another variable that may have to be considered is the 
number of years it will take to reach full storage capacity in a particular soil and place, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1.  Once storage capacity is reached, farmers would need to 
receive payments or be able to continually re-sell  the carbon offsets in place to maintain 
the stock.  Thus, the critical aspects are the amount of time soils can sequester carbon 
before the capacity is reached, and the amount that sequestered carbon held in place will 
be worth over the longer run. It is not definitely known at this point what these will be:  
We only know that payments for sequestering carbon for a set period of time must be at 
least as much as the cost incurred, including the opportunities foregone from mining 
carbon, in the process of sequestering and maintaining the carbon stock. 
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The answer to the question of whether Nebraska can compete also depends on the 
extent of the market.  If the entire global economy eventually has to offset emissions 
during the next 20-30 and perhaps up to 50 years with carbon storage, all suppliers, 
including Nebraska farmers and ranchers, will likely be able to sell storage at a profit.   If 
only modest limits are placed on few emitters (e.g., only the power plants),  perhaps other 
low cost supply areas such as Costa Rican rainforests would quickly saturate the market 
in offsets. Also, as with all commodities, and no matter the extent of the market,  the 
profit margins will generally vary widely.  For example, storing carbon in a  rain forest 
will perhaps always be less costly than storing the same amount of carbon in an area 
being intensively farmed.  
Yet, Nebraskans seemingly will still be able to earn enough profit from the 
changed practices to make it worthwhile. Like with all commodities, profitability per unit 
supplied depends on the price or payment being made available to the suppliers relative 
to the costs of providing said commodity.  Cost and return studies for various carbon 
technologies leading to varying levels of storage in Nebraska’s agricultural land need to 
be done, and possibilities examined. 
 
Stages in the Progress Toward  Market Trading 
 
 
Humans tend to build mechanisms to handle problems on a natural progression 
involving four fundamental types of social organization. Fiske (1992) sees the 
progression through four kinds of more elemental social organizations often culminating 
in market pricing types of mechanisms: 
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 Communal Sharing Æ  Authority Ranking Æ  Equality Matching Æ  Market Pricing 
 
The arrows  suggest the one-way movement over time toward market pricing, although it 
is the case that we also tend to move back and forth  on this continuum as conditions 
warrant.   Also, the arrows are meant to mean that oft times salient elements of earlier 
types of organization may be brought along into the later stages in the evolution.   The 
moral fabric pertaining to just and fair interactions as evolved in the communal sharing 
stage, e.g., may be embedded in the understructure of the market formed in the market 
pricing stage.  As Kuttner (1999, p. 349) argues,  we cannot presume that markets will 
never be instruments of private tyranny.  Safeguards need to be built into the underlying 
foundation on which any new carbon storage market will rest. 
With respect to carbon emissions and carbon storage, we start at some early time 
in the communal sharing mode, which  describes the  situation to date, wherein most 
everyone is emitting substantive amounts of carbon without regard for each other or for 
the capacity of the natural system to absorb the carbon.  At some point, we start to see the 
problems we are causing for ourselves and the natural system, so we ask some 
government agency to help to solve the problem as we enter into the authority ranking 
stage.  That is, we see the efficacy of strong centralized, and direct controls on carbon 
emissions,  in order to move directly and quickly to some solution,  and ask an agency 
like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to take charge.  Later, we see that some 
“tit-for-tat” strategies might work better, such as represented in carbon banks, with some 
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perhaps depositing carbon offsets and others taking draws on the offsets, in the equality 
matching stage.    
In the final market pricing stage, we see the evolution of trading in carbon 
emissions allowances and in carbon offsets representing carbon stored in place. We may 
keep the common ownership of the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb carbon from the 
communal sharing stage intact, but start to realize that government cannot solve the 
problem alone as in the authority ranking stage.  Yet,  we may recognize a legitimate role 
for government, and keep the central government agency from the authority ranking stage 
involved in order to set the caps; we may keep the carbon bank from the equality 
matching stage to help transactions;  finally, we may introduce carbon allowances for 
trade in the emissions market while we  introduce carbon offsets in stock for trade in the 
storage  (sequestration) market.  Over time, even more complex mechanisms evolve as 
the two kinds of markets start to interact.  
What stage are we currently in?   What progression over what period of time 
might we expect?  Drawing on both Fiske (1992) and Colby (2000, esp. Figure 1 on p. 
652), we are about to enter into Fiske’s authority ranking stage which is roughly the end 
Colby’s Stage 2, all of Stage 3, and positioning ourselves for Stage 4 as depicted in Table 
1.  We are currently a  considerable distance in time and place from the end state of 
market pricing and trading in emission allowances and in carbon offsets.   
Yet, if current legislation before the 107th Congress that places emission caps on 
power plants (In Senate bill S. 556 and House bill H.R. 1256) is passed during this 
session (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001), we could   move rather rapidly into Fiske’s equality 
matching stage, and  into Colby’s Stage 4 on our way to market pricing and well 
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functioning carbon markets in  Stage 5.  Recall that from the time of passage of  Title IV 
to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment, it was only about  3-years before sulfur 
allowance markets emerged (see Lynne and Kruse, 2001).  Just now, in the year 2001, the 
sulfur market is starting to operate quite effectively, suggesting that perhaps it will take  
about 10-years to reach market pricing in Stage 5 once the carbon emission limits are set 
in the late part of Stage 3 and the early part of Stage 4.  
 
Conclusions and Final Considerations 
 
 
Overall, the macro forces at work in the legal, regulatory and economic realms of the 
carbon question point toward the evolution of some kind of carbon market.  It seems 
reasonable to expect that we will eventually see carbon allowance markets not unlike that 
used for handling the sulfur emissions problem.  It would follow that if such carbon 
allowance markets emerge, we will also likely see markets in carbon offsets, represented 
by certificates  documenting the stock of carbon stored in the agricultural operation.  We 
could also see a market in carbon offsets in net inflow emerge, although this creates 
incentive problems in maintaining stocks in place.   Also, some believe that we might see 
markets emerge in best management practices, i.e., farmers signing contracts to farm in 
certain ways, using certain verifiable practices and technologies. We question that either 
payments or markets in carbon inflows or in best management practices is workable.  We 
suggest that the focus needs to be placed on carbon offsets representing stocks of carbon 
actually in storage in the land.  
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Considerable uncertainty about when, where, and how much marketing will 
emerge also exists, however,  due to widely differing views about how to handle the 
global warming and carbon problem, or even if there is a problem.  The problem in 
predicting the progress is that we may remain in the communal sharing, Stages 1 and 2 
arena for  quite some time.  Moving out of these stages only becomes possible after we 
decide that global warming is  a real issue needing caps set on carbon emissions.   Many 
members of theU.S. Congress are still of this mindset; perhaps many Americans 
including most Nebraskans are also of this inclination.  Also, there is a tendency to resist 
leaving the authority ranking stage once the government has been put in charge to solve 
the problem.  We always see resistance to let go, to release and decentralize.  The point 
we often miss in the ongoing dialogue about this problem is that both the government and  
the market need to play legitimate roles. The public policy experiment that is the sulfur 
allowances market verifies this contention.   The difficult problem we face is predicting 
when these perspectives might change, if at all, and thus predicting when behavior will 
change to taking some action to set emission limits and then, next, give flexibility back to 
individuals to choose options on how to solve the problem at the local level. Without 
limits set by government  and without decentralized flexibility for individuals,  there will 
be no carbon storage market, in either emission allowances or carbon stored. It also 
questionable that green payments will be effective without this recognition of a joint role 
for the government and the market. 
 Unfortunately, providing green payments for conservation could actually run 
counter to, and reduce the probability of,  new carbon markets.  With heavy public 
subsidy, there is no reason for the private sector to help with market solutions.  Also, 
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world negotiations relating to setting greenhouse gas emissions limits could break down 
even further (See Lynne and Kruse, 2001), although the mood seems to be one of doing 
something about the carbon problem, which generally means that some limits would need 
to be recognized, and asking the market to be an ever larger player in global interaction. .  
More specific considerations include: 
First, we perhaps cannot emphasize enough the need to focus on carbon offset in 
stock (COIS)  rather than carbon offset in flow (COIF), or best management practice 
(BMP) markets, the latter two  reflecting only changes in the storage or in the practices 
used by farmers and ranchers.  We see the COIS certificate, with each certificate perhaps 
representing 1-ton of carbon in place,  as defining the carbon commodity that Nebraskans 
would provide for sale on the market, or receive green payments to supply.   
Second, we need to face the aggregator problem.  Some vehicle may need to be 
found for bringing smaller suppliers together in order to provide viable quantities of 
COISs for sale, although current and emerging information technology using internet and 
web communications could make it feasible for even small numbers of  COIS certificates 
to be bought and sold.  It is already being done in the sulfur allowances market: Even 
individuals can buy and sell small numbers of allowances, as small as 1-ton at a time.  
This is perhaps the ultimate in a democratic market, wherein individuals can participate 
and influence the direction of the market. 
Third, some means is needed to certify the carbon is indeed in place, both at the 
outset and in re-certification periodically through the years of the buying and selling of 
the COIS for a particular tract. 
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Fourth,  consideration could be given to establishing a Nebraska Coalition not 
unlike the Montana Coalition, an entity with an executive director and a small staff 
dedicated to bringing units of COIS certificates and their related tracts of land together 
into viable units.  Alternatively, the Nebraska Natural Resource Districts could be the 
aggregators, although alternatively the NRDs could perhaps play a certifier’s role.  The 
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources could also conceivably play a role, perhaps 
as a central repository for recording carbon trades.  In considering this matter, however, 
we need to not preclude the possibility that private firms could also enter the certifying 
and aggregating, as well as brokerage and market information business. Some already 
have so entered on the international scene, and due to this ultimately being a global 
market, perhaps this is as it should be. Yet, opportunities will also exist for local, 
Nebraska firms. 
Fifth,  research needs to be encouraged on determining  the specific design of  
mechanisms to bring about and maintain the storage.  This research might best take the 
form of a case study aimed at developing a simulation to explore how an actual market in 
carbon offsets in stock (COIS) certificates might operate.   Particular attention needs to 
be placed on ensuring that a moral dimension is explicitly built into the foundation of the 
mechanism. This dimension would ensure a just and fair mechanism whether of a market 
or government payment format.  If the simulation goes well, actual trading in carbon 
offsets might be tried on a small scale, test basis. 
 Another altermative would beto commission cost studies focused on assessing 
the price at which Nebraska suppliers of carbon in storage can compete on the emerging 
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global markets.  Knowing  the cost structure could put Nebraskans at a competitive 
advantage in negotiations for trade.  
 Sixth, it is fortunate that Nebraska to date has been proactive in addressing the 
carbon question.  The Nebraska Unicameral had the foresight in the year 2000-2001 
session, through LB 957,  to create the Carbon Sequestration Advisory Committee, and to 
ask for  a background paper on  the legal, regulatory and  economic questions.  We need 
to continue the progressive steps already taken to ensure that Nebraskans can be players 
in national and international arenas as the carbon question is addressed world-wide, and 
work to influence how the problem of carbon driven global warming is solved.  
  
References 
 
Bromley, D. W. “Property Rights and Institutional Change.”  In Economic Interests and 
Institutions.  New York:  Basil Blackwell, 1989.  
 
Bromley, D. W. Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy.  
Cambridge, MA:  Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
 
Buyanovsky, G.A., M. Aslam, and G.H. Wagner. “Carbon Turnover in Soil Physical 
Fractions.”  Soil Sci. Amer. J.  58. (1994).  1167-1173. 
 
Casady, W and R. Massey. “Costs and Returns”.  In:  Conservation Tillage Systems and 
Management, 2nd Edition.  Ames, IA:  MidWest Plan Service, Iowa State 
University,  2000, pp. 62-68. 
 
Colby, B. G. “Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges:  A Tale of Three Markets.”  Land Econ. 
76, 4  (November, 2000):  638-658. 
 
Day, J., C. Sandretto, W. McBride, and V. Breneman.  “Conservation Tillage in US Corn 
Production: An Economic Appraisal.”  Paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the American Agricultural Economics Association, Salt Lake City Utah, August, 
1998:  Washington, D.C.:   Economic Research Service, USDA, 1998.  
 
 47
Duvick, D. N. and K. G. Cassman.  “Post-green-revolution Trends in Yield Potential of 
Temperate Maize in the North-Central United States.”   Crop Sci. (in press). 
 
Edmonds, J.A., S.H. Kim, C. N. MacCracken, R.D. Sands and M.A. Wise.  “Return to 
1990:  The Cost of Mitigating United States Carbon Emissions in the Post-2000 
Period.” PNNL-11819.  Washington, D.C.:  Battelle Washington Operations, 
Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1997. 
 
Ellerman, A. D., P. L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee,  J-P Montero,  and E. Bailey. Markets for 
Clean Air: The Acid Rain Program.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
2000. 
 
Feather, P.M., and J. Cooper.  “Voluntary Incentives for Reducing Agricultural Nonpoint 
Source Water Pollution.”   Agriculture Information Bulletin #716. Washington, 
D.C.:  USDA Economic Research Service, 1995.  
 
Fiske, A. P.  “The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality:  Framework for a Unified Theory 
of Social Relations.”   Psych. Rev.  99,4 (1992):  689-723. 
 
Frederick, R.  “Shifts in Tillage Practices Worth Noting”.  Lincoln, NE: Institute of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources,  University of Nebraska,  2001. 
 
Jenkinson, D.S.  “Studies on the Decomposition of Plant Material in Soil v. the Effects of 
Plant Cover and Soil Type on the Loss of Carbon From 14C Labelled Ryegrass 
Decomposing Under Field Conditions.”  J.  Soil Sci.  27 (1977):  424-434. 
 
Kuttner, R.  Everything for Sale:  The Virtues and Limits of Markets.   Chicago:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
 
Lal, R, J.M. Kimble, R.F. Follett, and C.V. Cole.  “The Potential of U.S. Cropland to 
Sequester Carbon and Mitigate the Greenhouse Effect”.  Boca Raton, FL: Lewis 
Publishers,  1999.  
 
Lynne, Gary D., C. Franklin Casey, Alan Hodges, and Mohammed Rahmani.  
"Conservation Technology Adoption Decisions and the Theory of Planned 
Behavior."  J. Econ. Psych. 16 (1995): 581-598.  
 
Lynne, G. D. and C. F. Casey.   “Regulatory Control of Technology Adoption by 
Individuals Pursuing Multiple Utility.”   J. Socio-Econ.  27, 6 (1998):  701-719. 
 
Lynne, G. D.  “Divided Self Models of the Socioeconomic Person:  The Metaeconomics 
Approach.”   J. Socio-Econ.  28, 3 (1999):  267-288.  
 
Lynne, G. D.  and  C. Kruse. “Conceptual Framework for Greenhouse Gas Sequestration 
Alternatives.”  Lincoln, NE:  Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska,  2001. 
 
 48
Lynne, G. D. and P. P. Saarinen.  "Melding Private and Public Interest in Water Rights 
Markets."  J. Agr. Appl. Econ. 25 (July 1993):  69-83. 
 
Office of the Chief Economist.  Economic Analysis of U.S. Agriculture and the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Washington, D.C.: Global Climate Change Program Office, 
U.S.Department of Agriculture, 1999. 
 
Metherall, A.K., L.A. Harding, C.V. Cole and W. J. Parton.  CENTURY SOM Model 
Environment.  Technical Documentation,  Agroecosystem Version 4.0.  Technical 
Report No. 4.   Fort Collins, CO: GPSR Unit, USDA-ARS, 1993. 
 
McCarl, B.A. and U. Schneider.  “U.S. Agriculture’s Role in a Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Mitigation World: An Economic Perspective.”  Rev. Agri. Econ. (forthcoming).  
 
NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council).  “Agricultural Soil Carbon Accumulation 
in North America: Considerations for Climate Policy.” (See:   
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/psoil.asp  ),  2000. 
 
New York Times (June 12, 2001). 
 
Parton, W.J., D. S. Schimel, C.V. Cole, and D. S Ojima.  “Analysis of Factors 
Controlling Soil Organic Matter Levels in Great Plains Grasslands”.  Soil Sci. 
Amer. J.  51 (1987): 1173-1179. 
 
Paustian, K., O. Andren, H.H. Janzen, R. Lal, P. Smith, G. Tian, H. Tiessen, M. Van 
Noordwijk, and P.L. Woomer.  “Agricultural Soils as a Sink to Mitigate CO2 
Emissions.”  Soil Use and Mgmt.  13 (1997):  230-244. 
 
Paustian, K., K. Killian, S. Williams, M. Sperow and J. Brenner.  “Evaluation and 
Refinement of the Century Model for Midwestern Agroecosystems” (in 
preparation). 
 
Selley, R.  “Crop Budgets”.  Lincoln, NE:  Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Nebraska, 2001.  
 
Stewart, E and A. Tirana. “HIID Brings 'Carbon Markets' to Mayagna Peoples in 
Nicaragua.”  The Harvard Gazette  (Feb. 12, 1999):  (See:  
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/1998/02.12/HIIDBringsCarbo.html ) 
 
Zeuli, K.A.  “Will Southern Agriculture Play a Role in a Carbon Market?”  J. Agri.  and 
Appl. Econ.  32, 2. (2000):  235-248. 
 49
Table 1.  Stages in Implementing Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms on the Way to Market 
Pricing 
 
Fiske (1992) Colby (2000) 
Communal Sharing Stage 1 
 
 
Stage 2
¾ Resource abundant 
¾ Few conflicts 
¾ Informal rights/rules  
¾ Scarcity perceived 
¾ Conflicts begin 
¾ Debate over proposals to limit use 
Authority Ranking Stage 3 ¾ Caps on use, rights allocation, and 
trading rules proposed and debated 
Equality Matching Stage 4 ¾ Caps on use established 
¾ Rights allocated 
¾ Trading rules promulgated 
¾ Cautious trading begins with high 
transaction costs 
¾ Ambiguities in rules/rights create 
conflicts 
¾ Rules/rights clarified 
Market Pricing Stage 5 ¾ Trading widely accepted 
¾ Active market develops 
¾ Transaction costs diminish 
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 Figure 1.   Logistic Growth of a Carbon Stock
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Figure 2.  Rate of Growth (Flow) of a Carbon Stock
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